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
GROWING THE PEACE:

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

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1990



AIR UNIVERSITY  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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AIR WAR COLLEGE

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GROWING THE PEACE:  
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM  
REQUIREMENT

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peace appears to be breaking out in Europe and much of the rest of the world. Yet other U.S. national security concerns remain, such as the Middle East, Central America, the Philippine Islands, and regional instability throughout much of the rest of the Third World. Coupled with increasingly constrained federal budgets, meeting these "other U.S. national security concerns" will be an even tougher task in the decade ahead. The more likely use of U.S. military forces may not even involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities and approaches may be required.

Consequently, this paper focuses on a "new approach", using an old method to meet these "other" U.S. national security concerns--namely, the appropriate application of military civic action (MCA). Through criterion analysis and the proper application of MCA, friends and allies in the Third World can be strengthened, especially those who face internal or external threats to their independence and stability.

These types of threats frequently occur in what the U.S. calls a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment. United States LIC strategy for helping friends and allies has three key goals, e.g., taking action to "ameliorate the root causes . . . before instability leads to widespread violence. . . strengthen the threatened regime's capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability. . . ." The achievement of these three goals is the essence of a preventive medicine LIC strategy--treating the root causes, not just the symptoms; acting

before violence becomes widespread; and making the country, not the U.S., responsible for "winning" its war.

A Third World country's task is made even harder as it frequently must offset and juggle vital development needs against legitimate defense requirements. Military forces of many Third World countries have capabilities applicable to development tasks such as well drilling, medical and dental assistance, and road building efforts by their engineers. To properly evaluate whether or not MCA is a useful option for a Third World country, the following criteria questions should be analyzed:

- o Which organizations can best meet the rural development needs--military, government civilian, and/or private sector?

- o Which tasks should be assigned to the military or would only be accomplished if the military did them?

- o What training is required and how much is transferable to the civilian sector after termination of military service?

- o If the military is assigned rural development projects, what degradation will occur to the military's capability to perform its traditional tasks?

- o If the military were to perform certain tasks, what impact would this have on civilian employment?

- o Regardless of which organization undertakes rural development, what will the participation level of the local populace be?

- o Will the military be truly committed to rural development, especially as part of a counterinsurgency strategy?

- o What are the overall goals for the rural development projects?

- o Should rural development projects be short-term or long-term?

No one can answer whether or not MCA is right for a given country without going through the kind of analysis represented by the criteria questions. A few key points about MCA need to be taken into account:

(1) It cannot be a band-aid fix. (2) It must be integrated with other

government development efforts. (3) The local populace must both select and want to work on the MCA projects. (4) The project must be right for the education and experience level of the populace.

In attempting to implement a U.S. preventive medicine LIC strategy, several changes need to be examined:

(1) Better department/agency integration is needed. The Agency for International Development and DOD frequently only cooperate if the "personalities" are right.

(2) United States humanitarian civic assistance laws emphasize the wrong things:

(a) U.S. participation instead of host nation participation. These projects must become "theirs".

(b) U.S. emphasis must be on training their trainers--not training benefit to U.S. forces. In the successful case of Indonesia, the Indonesian Army did not want U.S. advisors or counterparts in-country, but only the tools, funds, and training to meet its rural development objectives.

(3) Current U.S. military thinking emphasizes warfighting, not strategies to prevent conflict.

(4) Long-term, multi-year funding for security assistance is needed. Proper application of MCA takes years. In Thailand, MCA was consistently applied for ten years before victory was achieved.

An integrated, long-term approach designed to help our friends and allies develop economically viable, democratic societies is a prudent investment in America's future. By careful country-by-country analysis using the criteria questions, MCA will be appropriately integrated into each country's development planning and corresponding U.S. assistance efforts. The U.S. can successfully implement a preventive medicine LIC strategy by having (1) an expanded security assistance program with MCA, where applicable, a key focus; (2) more U.S. military advisor "presence"; (3) projects that are both "appropriate and theirs"; and (4) multi-year, prudently funded programs.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Brothers' most recent assignment before coming to the Air War College was as Chief of the Reserve Component Branch at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. He is a 1969 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. A command pilot, he flew as an instructor pilot in T-38 and B-52 aircraft, accumulating over 3,200 flying hours. He served in strategic and conventional planning while assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, and later served as a flight commander and instructor pilot in SAC's Strategic Projection Force--a rapidly deployable conventional munition air power force. He wrote several works while at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, including Technology Guidelines and Potential Military Applications in Low Intensity Conflicts; Overseas Deployment Training: A LIC Task Force Checklist Primer; portions of Operational Considerations for Military Involvement in LIC; and portions of A Framework for Competitive Strategies Development in Low Intensity Conflict. In addition, he provided information on low intensity conflict to Technology Review magazine.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

As the United States (U.S.) and its allies enter the decade of the 1990s, unprecedented changes are under way in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. The centerpiece of U.S. national security strategy over the past 45 years--strategic deterrence and alliance partnerships--has stemmed the spread of communism and precluded war in Europe. This strategy is now on the verge of becoming a total success, as attested to by the nearly-wholesale abandonment of communism by the countries of eastern Europe and the equally dramatic breakthroughs unfolding in conventional and strategic arms reduction talks. Western-like market capitalism is replacing many communist, state-run industries.

Many now feel that peace is at hand. Americans in particular feel a special validation of their ideals of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," which were a constant beacon of hope to those oppressed by communism and its ideology. The enormous costs to the U.S. for over 45 years of armed vigilance and determination seem justified.

As attainment of U.S. national security objectives in Europe is nearing completion, however, other U.S. national security concerns remain, such as the Middle East, Central America, the Philippine Islands, and regional instability throughout much of the rest of the Third World. Yet because many feel peace is at hand, Congress and the American people appear ready to move on to other priorities. Many now

believe that the biggest threat to continued U.S. prosperity comes from drugs and the international economic sector, rather than a direct, military attack. Coupled with increasingly constrained federal budgets, meeting these "other U.S. national security concerns" will be an even tougher task in the decade ahead.

As a result, this paper will focus on one aspect of these "other" U.S. national security concerns--namely, strengthening friends and allies in the Third World who face internal or external threats to their independence and stability. This type of struggle is what the U.S. calls a low intensity conflict (LIC).

In trying to deal with these threats, a Third World country's task is frequently complicated by the need to satisfy vital development needs as well as legitimate defense requirements. Their situation is further exacerbated, because U.S. security assistance funds and programs will probably continue to shrink in real dollars in the 1990s. Consequently, it is imperative for our Third World friends and allies to find ways to make the best use of their existing resources to meet the development and defense needs of their societies.

Given these two realities, fiscally constrained U.S. help and dual development-defense needs, this paper will examine revitalizing an old concept for "growing the peace"--military civic action (MCA). In MCA, the military is not only responsible for defense but also various parts of integrated national development efforts. Hence, when properly applied, MCA can contribute to both the development and defense needs of the country.

To lay a proper framework for analysis, this paper will first review the overall LIC environment much of the Third World faces. It

will then review current U.S. national security strategy for LIC with a specific focus on Latin America. Next it will look at historical evidence for and against MCA. Then it will suggest criteria questions that a Third World country might use for evaluating MCA as a relevant option to meet its dual development-defense needs. Finally, the paper will examine MCA implications for U.S. policy.

## CHAPTER II

### LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Because of the unfolding events in the Soviet Union, the likelihood of an armed superpower confrontation seems remote. The most likely area of confrontation will be in the realm of low intensity conflict as then Vice President George Bush predicted in May 1986:

The most active threat we face today [is] the war in the shadows. This threat is manifested in a stream of hostage crises, terrorist attacks, local conflicts, and insurgencies. This is our most active threat for the remainder of the century. . . .<sup>1</sup>

According to the current DOD definition, LIC is:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.<sup>2</sup>

For those engaged in a shooting conflict, of course, its intensity is anything but low. But much of international law recognizes only two basic conditions--peace or declared war. With the possible exception of the recent Iran-Iraq hostilities, the last declared war ended in 1945. Undeclared wars, police actions, and the like have been the rule since then. LIC neatly fits the gray area between peace and conventional, declared war. Also in contrast with the level of forces involved in World War II or Korea, the conflicts at issue here are of a lower magnitude and scope, even though the violence is just as intense and

deadly. One should also keep in mind that LIC is a term for looking at the world primarily from a perspective of U.S. interests and concerns.

#### Costs of Low Intensity Conflicts

Many of the confrontations labeled as LIC occur in the lesser developed countries of the Third World. These countries are beset by the natural instability associated with developmental growth. Many of these same countries also lack political and economic opportunities to keep up with their people's rising expectations. Statistics comparing the poorest one-fifth of the world's population to the richest one-fifth for certain categories of information are quite revealing (See Table 1).

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TABLE 1 - Comparative Social Data 1987

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>RICHEST 1/5</u>	<u>POOREST 1/5</u>
GNP PER CAPITA (\$)	12,286	238
GOV HEALTH EXPEND PER CAPITA (\$)	573	2
LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS)	75	57
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (UNDER 1 YR)	14	110
POPULATION WITH SAFE WATER (%)	100	46

-----

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989 (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1989), p. 29.

The report from which these data are drawn further states that 2.7 billion people live in poverty, having incomes of less than \$500 per year; 10 million babies die annually before their first birthday; and 2.9 billion people do not have a dependable supply of safe drinking water.<sup>3</sup>

One author notes that in Latin America, many different groups are beginning to awaken the campesino's consciousness to their poverty-stricken condition. As the campesino demands government action to meet his grievances, he frequently encounters indifference by both the government and the country's elite. Consequently, he often joins a more radical group (frequently communist) that promises action.<sup>4</sup>

With these kinds of needs rampant throughout the Third World, not just in Latin America, a revolution in one form or another is inevitable--all that is needed is a catalyst! The question becomes, "When the catalyst is applied, will it move countries toward democracy and economic free enterprise or some form of authoritarian or totalitarian government?"

For those immersed in the LIC environment, the costs have been extremely high in terms of governments overthrown, lives lost, and tremendous armament costs. From 1955-1986, for example, there were numerous governments overthrown in the Third World through coups d'etat, revolutionary warfare, etc. When examined by region, the statistics are as follows:

- o Central and South America--90.
- o Africa--109.
- o Southwest Asia--63.
- o Southeast Asia and Pacific Basin--46.<sup>5</sup>

The costs in terms of lives lost is equally staggering. As a result of both World War I and II, there were approximately 60 million civilian and military fatalities. This figure includes holocaust and other displacement casualties. Since the end of World War II, there have been at least 127 wars or conflicts fought, in which 1,000 or more

deaths occurred in a given year. The total comes to more than 21.809 million fatalities. This figure includes combatant deaths as well as war-related casualties due to famine, disease outbreaks, etc.<sup>6</sup>

The military armament costs have been equally high. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports over \$10.123 trillion spent worldwide between 1977 and 1987 (1987 constant dollars) for military expenditures.<sup>7</sup> Ruth Leger Sivard reports that the Third World portion of this for 1977-1987 was \$1.447 trillion. For 1987, it is \$144 billion, consuming more than five percent of the Third World's aggregate gross national product (GNP).<sup>8</sup> Besides the economic drain, the Third World is literally an armed camp.

Taken together, these trends do not bode well for Third World nations. Historical animosities in the Balkans and Caucasus regions of the Soviet Union are already flaring up. The killing fields in Kampuchea are quite likely to become extremely bloody again. Terrorist groups or small nations that gain access to increasingly deadly armaments can further destabilize these areas. When huge foreign debts are factored in, then the prospects of positive economic development and a progressive society in the Third World can be set back centuries.

#### Low Intensity Conflict Threats to the United States

By the mid-1980s, the LIC phenomena was recognized as posing several insidious threats to long-term U.S. interests. One of the first key documents to outline these threats was a January 1987 White House paper, National Security Strategy of the United States. It stated that the LIC environment is ripe for exploitation by interests hostile to the U.S., which can lead to:

- o Interruption of Western access to vital resources.
- o Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access rights.
- o Expanded threats to sea lines of communication.
- o Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners into positions of accommodation with hostile interests.
- o Expanded opportunities for Soviet political and military gains.<sup>9</sup>

With the recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, even the LIC threat seems lower, especially since the Soviets seem less interested in exploiting opportunities in the Third World. However, the March 1990 report on the National Security Strategy of the United States notes that many Third World conflicts will continue to threaten U.S. interests:

- o Lower-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking.
- o Highly destructive regional wars will remain a danger, made even greater by the expansion of the armed forces of regional powers and the proliferation of advanced weaponry. . . [to include] chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons--along with long-range delivery systems.
- o Instability due to poverty, social injustice, racial, religious, or ethnic tensions will continue, whether or not exploited by the Soviets.<sup>10</sup>

With the exception of the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, most LIC threats are not considered an immediate risk to U.S. national survival. Consequently, solutions often require vision, patience, and long-term commitments of personnel and resources in unglamorous jobs and places. Yet, because most of these threats are insidious and of a low-threat nature, it is difficult to find sufficient advocacy for the personnel, programs, and funding required to develop an effective U.S. strategy.



## CHAPTER III

### NATIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

After this brief look at the LIC environment Third World countries frequently face, what then is the U.S. national strategy to counteract the LIC threat and the unstable environment in which it occurs? First, it should be kept in mind that not every low intensity conflict has a direct impact on U.S. national security interests. Examples of conflicts not immediately affecting U.S. national security interests might be the civil unrest in Sri Lanka, northern India, or southeastern Yugoslavia. Second, with recent events in the Soviet Union and other Soviet client states, not every Third World conflict has direct Soviet-U.S. connotations. Examples are the conflicts in Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia, and several other African nations. But what is the U.S. LIC strategy?

While not the most current statement of U.S. national strategy, perhaps the clearest for purposes of this paper is in the January 1988 report on the National Security Strategy of the United States. It states:

When it is in U.S. interest to do so, the United States will:

- o Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World by promoting economic development and the growth of democratic political institutions.
- o Support selected resistance movements opposing oppressive regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies.

- o Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by employing appropriate instruments of U.S. power. Where possible, action will be taken early--before instability leads to widespread violence; and emphasis will be placed on those measures which strengthen the threatened regime's long-term capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability.

- o Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability.

- o Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.<sup>11</sup>

The March 1990 report on the National Security Strategy of the United States echoes a similar LIC strategy but recognizes the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and some of its former client states.

Consequently, U.S. policymakers may:

- o Decide which risks can be ameliorated by means other than military capability--means like negotiations, burden sharing, economic and security assistance, economic leverage, and political leadership.

- o See that the more likely demands for the use of our military forces may not involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities and approaches may be required.<sup>12</sup>

From these two documents, there are three key goals to highlight: taking action (1) to ameliorate the root causes; (2) before instability leads to widespread violence; and (3) strengthen the threatened regime's capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability. A fourth notable item is that new capabilities and approaches may be required. The achievement of the three goals is the essence of a preventive medicine LIC strategy--treating the root causes, not just the symptoms; taking action before violence becomes widespread; and making the country, not the U.S., responsible for "winning" its war. As LIC is frequently a protracted struggle and as the budget climate will be austere, new thinking on how to solve LICs will be necessary.

This makes the reexamination of an old concept like MCA especially valuable at this point in time. Whatever solutions are developed must involve all elements of national power--political, economic, informational, psychological, and military. Military action alone will not solve a LIC. Military solutions merely buy time, but frequently do nothing to ameliorate the root causes of popular dissatisfaction. However, MCA, as part of an integrated government approach may offer a solution particularly appropriate in the Third World.

As to the means to achieve these goals, the January 1988 report indicates that "the most appropriate application of U.S. military power is usually indirect through security assistance--training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment."<sup>13</sup> The March 1990 report places even heavier emphasis on security assistance as one of the most cost-effective and indispensable means of achieving U.S. LIC goals and objectives in the Third World. In addition, it also pointed to stronger involvement by allies and friendly nations. "We now look to them to assume a greater share in providing for our common defense. . . (and will) try to involve other industrial democracies in preventing and resolving Third World conflicts."<sup>14</sup>

The importance of noncombat activities in LIC was also recognized in Defense Guidance for FY90-94, "[283] (U) Support LIC operational requirements by improving predeployment training of active component and reserve component medical, engineer, and civil affairs elements. . . to support the regional CINCs in a LIC environment."<sup>15</sup> This points to the essential types of military skills needed to solve the dual development-defense dilemma of many Third World countries.

## CHAPTER IV

### UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICAN

Before attempting to address U.S. treatment of the LIC threat in Latin America, a brief historical overview is necessary. This chapter will examine some of the historic characteristics of Latin America that, from a U.S. perspective, make finding LIC solutions very challenging. In addition, historic U.S. policy dealings with Latin America will be reviewed, because many feel U.S. high-handedness towards Latin America has been one of the root causes that permits the LIC environment to flourish south of the U.S. border.

#### Perceptions of Latin America

Both hemispheres of the Americas were colonized at approximately the same time, with the north being predominantly colonized by Britain, whereas the south was predominantly colonized by Spain. Yet, to date, the development differences, economic wealth, and military power are vastly different. What could account for such vast differences? Culture? Religion? Natural resources? Political institutions? The questions are difficult to answer with any degree of absolute certainty.

One of the first differences one notes about Latin America is the strong degree of influence the Roman Catholic church had during the colonization period. The church influenced the poor to accept their lot and to be content with what they had, which reflected Biblical teachings of true servanthood.

A second factor was the strong authoritarian rule the Spanish brought with them. These caudillos or military rulers had a virtual free hand in governing their Latin American domains. In addition, those in authority received little salary from the crown. Instead, public servants or rulers were expected to supplement their living from the people they served. Consequently, if anyone wanted something "official" accomplished, payment for services rendered was required. Today, in the U.S., we call it a bribe. Back then and up to the present, many Latin America public servants require payment of such a "debt of gratitude" to make ends meet.<sup>16</sup>

Taken together, these two factors--Spanish authoritarian rule and acceptance by the peasant of his role as a servant--led to a cultural bias of elite rulers and poor peasants or campesinos, with virtually no middle class. As the Spanish galleons stripped the Americas of her wealth, so the caudillos followed in that tradition.

One must also remember that when Latin American states won their independence during the 1800s, it was accomplished basically by an armed revolution. Consequently, the place of the military as the guarantor of national sovereignty was etched deeply in the people's psyche.

A final characteristic of Latin Americans is "Knowledge is power." If someone knows what you know, then you are no longer needed and your personal power will diminish. Consider an example from Honduras. One military district had 40 portable radios and two machine guns, whereas the neighboring district had 60 machine guns and no radios.<sup>17</sup> This seriously hampered cooperation and information sharing.

## United States-Latin American Relations

Since the beginning of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the U.S. has been heavily involved in the evolution and development of Latin America. President Ronald Reagan perhaps best summed up U.S. Latin American policy objectives since the turn of the century with the classic four "Ds"--democracy, dialogue, development, and defense.<sup>18</sup> Each U.S. president has basically sought the achievement of these four aims, although the methods have varied greatly and much of the dialogue has been one way.

### From Teddy Roosevelt to FDR

President Theodore Roosevelt stated his approach through his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine--the U.S. would be the sole policing authority in the Americas, settling all disputes arising between Latin American and external powers. This led to U.S. customs receiverships in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Virgin Islands were purchased, and Puerto Rico became a U.S. protectorate. The U.S. directly intervened and/or occupied Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico for varying periods of time. Some interventions were to protect American lives and/or economic interests; others were to remove governments hostile or unwilling to cooperate with U.S. interests.<sup>19</sup>

With the advent of the Great Depression and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President, U.S. policy toward Latin America shifted significantly. President Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy began an era in which the U.S. sought more of a partnership role rather than what some have labeled as "imperialist domination".<sup>20</sup>

## Post World War II

World War II brought a relatively stable and prosperous relationship with the U.S. for Latin America. United States defense interests were basically outward-looking defense, e.g., defense against invasion from Germany. Thus, the U.S. sought basing rights to protect the water accesses to the Panama Canal, and it also worked to preclude governments sympathetic to the Axis powers from gaining a strong foothold in Latin America.

After World War II, however, the U.S. decided not to offer Marshall Plan aid to Latin American countries. Thus, their situation deteriorated substantially in comparison with that of Europe and Japan, which experienced major economic recoveries. Military treaties and assistance remained focused against external threats, just as they had during World War II.

During the 1950s, there was some concern about armed communist expansion like that attempted in Korea and Guatemala. But it was not until 1957, during the Eisenhower administration, that the U.S. took its first serious review of its Latin American policy, considering both economic and defense issues. After Castro's communist takeover in Cuba in 1959, the need for change became even stronger.

## The Alliance for Progress

With the election of John F. Kennedy as President, a new era of U.S. involvement with its Latin American neighbors blossomed, reminiscent of the years under FDR in the 1930s. Since the end of World War II, Latin American leaders had persistently been calling for cooperative economic and social building of all the Americas. These

pleas, coupled with American fears of Castro-like communism spreading throughout Latin America by guerrilla warfare, induced President Kennedy to proclaim a new alliance in 1961--the Alliance for Progress. Its major goals were economic progress and social justice within a framework of democratic institutions. During the decade of the 1960s, \$20 billion was to be invested in the region, \$10 billion coming from the public sector and \$10 billion from the private sector. Of this total, internal sources were to provide 80 percent. Thus, the financial burden was to be borne by the individual countries themselves.<sup>21</sup> External capital was to be the impetus to jump-start the economic, social, and political revolution.

After President Kennedy's assassination, the Alliance's goals were substantially altered by President Lyndon Johnson. He continued to support the economic development programs, but dropped support for the social justice and democratic institution elements of the Alliance.

#### Shift in Military Emphasis

Concurrent with the Alliance, U.S. military assistance was aimed largely at strengthening internal security, e.g., counterinsurgency capability as the following congressional testimony indicates:

The review of past accomplishments and the changing situation in Latin America led to the conclusion that a significant shift in emphasis would be necessary. . . . The Castro regime announced its intention to promote the overthrow of Latin American governments. Subversion and guerrilla warfare will be used deliberately. . . . The governments of Latin America will contribute most toward hemisphere defense and the security of the United States by maintaining their internal security.<sup>22</sup>

Military assistance programs were aimed at improving internal security forces, instituting military civic action to foster strong rural ties with the campesinos, and creating apolitical militias.<sup>23</sup>



With this shift in military program emphasis, success was achieved in stemming the tide of Castro's revolutionary exports. Communist-led subversion was stopped in Venezuela and Peru in the early 1960s. As a result of these early successes and increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam, U.S. military assistance declined substantially as the decade of the 1970s approached.

By the onset of the 1970s, any significant U.S. support for even the economic development programs of the Alliance had waned, and official U.S. backing for the Alliance ended in 1975. Congress, in reviewing the achievements of the Alliance, determined that the oligarchies had increased their wealth and power without adequate redistribution of these gains to the poorer elements of their societies. Consequently, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was revised in 1973. The "new directions" contained in the bill shifted program emphasis from economic growth to meeting basic human needs, especially problems of the poor.<sup>24</sup>

For the remainder of the decade and into the early 1980s, U.S. neglect of Latin America held sway. Concluding the Vietnam conflict and dealing with the embargo imposed in 1973 by oil-producing Arab states preoccupied the U.S. During this same period, much of Latin America reverted to dictatorships and abandoned democratic institutions.

#### The Sandinista Revolution

At the close of this decade of American neglect of Latin America, the successful Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979, which overthrew the U.S.-backed Somoza dynasty, unexpectedly turned communist. Like the shock of Cuba turning communist in 1959, the Sandinista revolution forced the U.S. out of its lethargy and period of self-

recrimination after Vietnam. Also, during the same year, the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada was seized in a coup d'etat by a Marxist, Maurice Bishop.

When Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, communist expansion efforts in Latin America were a serious concern. Efforts to organize, train, fund, and equip the Contras to oppose the Sandinistas were begun, but the prospect for quick results did not look promising. The civil war in El Salvador was worsening. By 1983, many felt El Salvador was about to go the way of Nicaragua. Many feared the communist tide would then logically sweep into Honduras or Guatemala.

In addition, Grenada, in the eastern Caribbean, was continuing to destabilize from a U.S. perspective. When Maurice Bishop seized power in 1979, he held widespread popular support, despite being a Marxist. But within three months of taking power, he reneged on his promise of free elections. His government suppressed freedom of the press and quickly became diplomatically linked with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro pledged Cuban aid and "engineers" to build the new Point Salines runway, which turned out to be substantially longer than any commercial aviation needs warranted.<sup>25</sup> Grenada seemed to be headed the way of Cuba and Nicaragua.

The long-held American policy of communist containment thus appeared thwarted in America's own backyard. The "domino effect" was clearly gaining momentum in Latin America.

Remember, too, the American psyche was scarred--defeat in Vietnam, the seizure of American hostages in Iran, and the ill-fated Desert One rescue attempt of those hostages. America, the most powerful

nation on earth, seemed unable or unwilling to act. A "victory" against anti-American foes was sorely needed.

The first visible linchpin that reflected America's regained ability to react directly and successfully against interests hostile to the U.S. was the invasion of Grenada. The U.S. and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), to which Grenada belonged, tolerated Bishop's government initially. But when he was murdered and replaced by the hard-line Marxist, Hudson Austin, the OECS became very alarmed. Shortly thereafter, the OECS requested the U.S. lead a multinational intervention in Grenada to restore order and democratic rule.<sup>26</sup> The subsequent operation--Urgent Fury--proved highly successful and restored democratic rule to Grenada. From the U.S. perspective, the Grenada invasion was a highly visible "victory", announcing an end to a period of American doubt and indecisiveness to the international community.

#### The Central American Initiative

Despite American success in Grenada, President Reagan was still concerned with the Central American dilemma. In 1982, the President commissioned a bipartisan group to study long-term solutions to the Central American problem. The commission, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, was headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Its report, delivered in January 1984, stated:

The crisis in Central America had indigenous roots in a long history of social injustice, maldistribution of national income, government oppression, and closed political systems. But world economic recession and Cuban-Soviet-Nicaraguan intervention brought it to a head. . . . Ultimate resolutions depend on economic progress, social and political reform. But insurgencies must be checked if lasting progress is to be made on these fronts. Indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is no threat to the U.S. But the intrusion of outside powers exploiting local grievances for political and strategic advantage is a serious threat.<sup>27</sup>

The Commission identified three elements inseparably linked in the crisis was to be resolved--political, security, and social/economic. The Commission recommended multi-year funding for military aid to the region but did not specify any funding level or specific actions. With respect to the other two elements, the Commission recommended a greatly expanded financial assistance program of about \$21 billion, of which \$10-12 billion would come from the U.S.<sup>28</sup>

As a result of this report, President Reagan proposed legislation known as the Central American Initiative (CAI). The CAI concentrated on economic, social, and democratization goals. Military requirements were addressed but were not the central thrust of the legislation. The four principal goals were:

- o Strengthening democratic institutions and practices;
- o Arresting economic decline and promoting economic stabilization;
- o Laying the basis, through structural transformation, for sustained economic growth; and
- o Increasing equity and spreading the benefits of economic growth.<sup>29</sup>

For FY87-89, U.S. support for the CAI in the economic and social arena--which includes development assistance, economic support funds, Peace Corps, and anti-narcotics funds--was funded at \$3.997 billion.<sup>30</sup>

#### Military Assistance

In the security arena, besides the decisive action in Grenada, U.S. military activity and assistance in the Central American region greatly expanded. Covert and overt support for the Contras was hotly debated before the Congress and in the media. A series of major military exercises between U.S. and Honduran forces began in 1984. This resulted in the establishment of the U.S.-run Joint Task Force BRAVO at

Palmerola (now Soto Cano) Air Base, Honduras, to coordinate the various exercises.

In 1983 in El Salvador, guerrilla units were attacking in battalion-size elements in broad daylight, with many predicting that the guerrillas "final offensive" was about to topple the U.S.-backed El Salvadoran government. However, the U.S. decided to render substantial economic and military aid to El Salvador, one element of which was three AC-47 gunships. These gunships effectively decimated the guerrilla attacks, and forced the guerrillas back to small band, hit-and-run tactics, turning their "final offensive" into a spectacular government victory.

For the period of FY87-89, U.S. military assistance to all of Latin America (excluding the Contras) was funded at \$554.124 million through the military assistance program and the international military education and training program.<sup>31</sup>

#### Development and Defense

The preceding review of how the U.S. seeks to meet Latin America's development and defense needs may leave the impression that the U.S. has two separate and, perhaps, mutually exclusive programs for Latin America. In reality, both aspects are covered under a single budget account for "International Affairs", the overall direction of which is the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State. The "150 account" is a multi-faceted account consisting of nine principal elements of U.S. foreign economic and security assistance as shown by Figure 1.

## International Affairs Budget




Figure 132

In order to see how development and defense needs tie together, a review of a specific country--Guatemala--will prove beneficial. For instance, security assistance programs and objectives for FY91 for Guatemala were:

- o Improve air/ground mobility, communications, logistics and medical equipment.
- o Provide engineering equipment for infrastructure development in remote areas.
- o Provide balance of payments support and support for programs which foster rural productivity, non-traditional exports and improved health and education services.
- o Support the elected civilian government's efforts to professionalize the security forces.<sup>33</sup>

To achieve these goals, President Bush recommended to the Congress that the U.S. provide \$129.494 million in aid to Guatemala in FY90--\$5.4 million in military assistance and \$124.09 million in economic assistance.<sup>34</sup>

### The Decade of the 1990s

As the U.S. and its Latin American neighbors enter the 1990s, the classic four "Ds" have grown to six--democracy, dialogue, development, defense, debt, and drugs. These six form a valid construct for developing appropriate agendas to shape hemispheric relations.

The substantial economic and military assistance that the U.S. has provided to Latin America--well in excess of \$20 billion--in some respects seems to be paying off.<sup>35</sup> With the startling victory of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua's presidential elections this past February, only Cuba remains opposed to the tide of democracy sweeping Latin America. Just as in eastern Europe, Latin American nations are turning to democracy and capitalistic economies for their future. Several governments in Central America have had their first legal changes of elected governments ever. Brazil has recently ended 29 years of military control.

Yet, all is not well in Latin America. External debt has reached crisis proportions--more than \$380 billion in 1987, which eats up more than \$19 billion annually in interest payments alone.<sup>36</sup> A greater and greater percentage of the region's gross national product (GNP) must be used to pay off the debt. These payments frequently only come from the export side of their economies. In 1987, Latin America exported \$90 billion worth of goods while importing nearly \$70 billion.<sup>37</sup> While this surplus of \$20 billion appears enough to cover the interest payments due, it leaves no money for internal investment and capitalization, ingredients necessary to attain a modest annual increase in export GNP to repay the debt.

Concurrently, the U.S. faces its own monetary problems in attempting to bring federal deficit spending under control. At present, U.S. annual deficits run over \$200 billion. This is the real debt, not the smoke and mirrors political game Congress and the President are currently playing under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Therefore, any substantial U.S. public funding for Latin American aid will become increasingly more difficult.

As a result, fledgling Latin American democracies may be hard pressed to provide the social and economic opportunities their burgeoning populations demand. Honest, efficient, and effective use of scarce resources will be critical if governments are to overcome the debt burden and still develop progressive societies. Reviving MCA to help meet the dual development-defense needs may be one way of doing more with less.



## CHAPTER V

### MILITARY CIVIC ACTION--PROs AND CONs

Having examined the LIC environment, U.S. national LIC strategy and how it has been applied in Latin America, let us now turn to a brief historical review of MCA before looking at its applicability to Latin America.

#### The PROs

Much has been written about the peaceful use of armed forces in national development. United States history is replete with many examples of how U.S. armed forces helped build a vast, and often, unexplored territory. Most of the early cartography expeditions were led by military men like George Washington. Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, both Army officers, led the great exploration of the Louisiana purchase and the Pacific northwest territories. Admirals Richard Byrd and Robert Peary pioneered American polar exploration. Many of the river dams, bridges, and levies were built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In fact, the Corps is still hard at work in many projects today throughout the continental U.S. and its territories overseas. There are many other types of activity the U.S. military has played a role in. A few examples are medical research that led to cures for typhoid, yellow fever, and beriberi; hurricane hunter aircraft; oceanographic research; and food preservation through irradiation.<sup>38</sup>

Other nations have made extensive use of their armed forces in rural infrastructure development. Pakistan is a good example. One area of northwest Pakistan, Gilgit, was served by foot trails and air resupply during good weather. As a 14,000 foot pass was only open three months out of the year, the region was commercially inaccessible. The government initially projected the cost of a road to open the region at 60.6 million rupees--too expensive. Subsequently, Army assistance was sought, and the project was given to the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps' revised estimates came to about 30.5 million rupees, half of the civilian-only estimate. Work began in 1959 and was due to be completed by 1965. The project was divided between the Army and the Public Works Department. The Public Works Department took responsibility to widen an existing 87 mile stretch of jeep trail from Chilas to Gilgit at an estimated cost of 8 million rupees. The Army Corps of Engineers took responsibility for a 158 mile stretch from Karora to Chilas, where no road existed, at an estimated cost of 20.4 million rupees.<sup>39</sup> This example demonstrates how appropriate use of the armed forces can save the government substantial sums of money, while at the same time providing important commercial development opportunities.

Brazil is another example where the armed forces have played a leading role in exploration and development of the vast Amazon region and northeastern territories. Most of the road network opening up these vast regions is the result of army engineer efforts. This has permitted development of mining, farming, and timber operations essential to Brazil's rapid rise as an economic power in the region. While working in these remote regions, the Brazilian army engineers have also provided

the civilian populace with schools, apprenticeship and farm training, medical care and facilities, and some elementary school instructors.<sup>40</sup>

In the Philippine Islands, during the Huk rebellion in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the military under Ramon Magsaysay's leadership was able to use resettlement farms as a tool to quell the rebellion. Rather than merely killing guerrillas, better alternatives were developed by using surplus government land to be given to rehabilitated guerrillas to develop under stringent rules.<sup>41</sup> The program was a success and directly contributed to quelling the rebellion. However, the opposition of the entrenched oligarchies to Magsaysay's program steadily grew stronger. Unfortunately, Magsaysay's untimely death in March 1957 led to a rapid phase-out of the program, especially with the Huk rebellion quelled.

In Indonesia, political uncertainty and economic decline under the Sukarno regime resulted in a coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965, which was quickly thwarted by the military. Due to Sukarno's leniency on the communists, the military took control of the government in 1966, providing both internal security and leadership of the development process. One Indonesian army commander was quoted as saying, "We cannot say 'Let's improve production' and do nothing ourselves. People see us and say the Army is not so bad if they see us doing things that are productive."<sup>42</sup> Today in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has one of the highest overall GNPs in the region.

These are but a few examples of the pros for using armed forces for developing rural infrastructure. But what of the cons? Is there really enough "value added" to make use of the armed forces worthwhile in national development?

### The CONS

One of the primary cons to use of the armed forces is that they will gain undue influence in the country, which may inevitably lead to military dictatorships. Prime illustrations, in which the U.S. has played a significant role, are Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. During the U.S. occupation of these countries and as a prelude to U.S. withdrawal, U.S. forces formed a "national guard". This national guard was to help administer essential services in the rural areas until the newly formed civilian governments could become established. Initially, these national guards did much to improve their respective countries through road building, health care, clean water sources, and other public services.<sup>43</sup> However a good beginning does not guarantee a good ending. The leaders of these national guards soon became the willing instruments of their country's often brutal dictators. As the dictators sought to become more entrenched in power, these national guards often became the implementing tools of brutal repression.

Another case in point is the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF was formed, trained, and equipped by the U.S. to defend the Panama Canal. After the scheduled U.S. withdrawal from the Canal in 1999, the PDF would take over responsibility for protection of the Canal, guaranteeing access rights to all. But if one examines the threat to the canal and the composition of the PDF, it becomes apparent that such a force is not really necessary. First of all, the canal is indefensible from a land attack. There are too many sites from which a saboteur can launch an undetected attack. Blocking the canal by mining

a ship is a relatively easy proposition. Therefore, the heavy armament, organization, and overall composition of the PDF does not make good sense. And the repressive results under General Manuel Noriega's leadership are well known.

Yet, after the recent U.S. invasion, reports coming out of Panama indicate that the U.S. still wants a strong, professional military force in Panama to protect the Canal. The implication is that if the PDF was a professional force (like the U.S. military), then a dictator like Noriega would never have come to power. The Endara government, on the other hand, wants only a police force similar to that in Costa Rica.<sup>44</sup> Perhaps it is time for the U.S. to listen to what the Panamanians say they need.

In addition, Third World military establishments have a habit of seizing power from legally constituted governments, when said governments' practices send the country in the "wrong" direction. In Latin America alone since 1945, there have been more than 90 such illegal changes in government. Of the 90, almost all were directed by or carried out with the consent of the local military establishment.<sup>45</sup>

Another criticism is that rural development tasks are not a military mission. To acquire the skills needed, essential training time would be wasted, reducing overall military effectiveness. One comment from a Tanzanian officer, when faced with doing public works was, "These are soldiers!"<sup>46</sup>

A final complaint relates to civilian jobs. If the military builds roads, then jobs civilians could perform will not be available. As most Third World countries do have high unemployment, the criticism

may be valid. In the U.S., military engineers are prohibited from building roads so civilian firms may contract for the work.

#### Military Versus Civilian Rule--A Mixed Bag

Because of the previously mentioned "cons", many feel that a strong military establishment in a Latin American country is antithetical to development of democratic institutions. Yet, removal of repressive military regimes is not always the solution either. For example, Fidel Castro replaced Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, Daniel Ortega replaced Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini replaced Mohammed Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Each of these new leaders eventually forced their respective economies into bankruptcy, not to mention the massive social upheaval created by their coming to power.

Historically, Latin American countries have cycled between authoritarian regimes followed by democratically elected governments. For example, the 1950s were basically authoritarian years, whereas the 1960s were basically democratic years and hailed as the twilight of dictatorships. The 1970s saw the reemergence of authoritarian rule. By the 1980s, however, a reversal to democratic principles held sway. Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, for instance, had moved to democratically-led governments. Yet when one compares the economic well being of these countries under democracy with that under the more authoritarian rule of the 1970s, democratic principles have yet to prove they are the panacea for economic ills (See Table 2).

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Table 2--Regime Type and GNP Effects

Country	Regime Type	
	Authoritarian (1971-1980)	Democratic (1981-1988)
Peru	3.80	1.45
Ecuador	8.90	1.49
Honduras	5.50	1.85
El Salvador	3.20	0.37
Guatemala	5.70	0.60

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Source: Agency for International Development. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1989 Report. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989, p. 10.

Unless sustained improvements in the development picture occur, the trend toward democratic institutions as the savior for a country may become another shattered dream. Military civic action, when properly applied and integrated into national efforts, can boost productivity in both defense and development--even under military governments.

## CHAPTER VI

### IS MILITARY CIVIC ACTION RIGHT FOR LATIN AMERICA TODAY?

Is MCA a valid way of improving society today in Latin America? The preceding arguments have shown that when properly applied, it has had a beneficial, positive impact in several countries. First, one must remember the cultural and historical background in Latin America. The military has been a player in Latin American affairs since the revolutions of the 1800s. Second, it is an institution that has a vested interest in seeing its own piece of the pie protected. But does it have capabilities to aid in rural development?

#### Rural Development Capability Estimates

In order to determine the relative capabilities of the military and civilian sectors to do rural development tasks, the author conducted several selective interviews with foreign officers attending various Air University schools. They were asked to provide their estimate of their country's capability to meet a set of hypothetical rural development goals. They were asked to estimate how much of each hypothetical goal could be met if (1) it was performed only by military personnel or (2) if it was performed only by the civilian sector. The hypothetical rural development goals are as follows:

- (a) Inoculate as required and/or treat 90% of the rural populace by a doctor and a dentist once a year;



(b) Add annually 6,000 kilometers of new rural roads or significant upgrades to existing rural roads such as dirt to gravel or gravel to paved;

(c) Provide 90% of the rural villages with sanitary drinking water and at least one appropriately sized public latrine; and

(d) Add one public building such as a school or clinic to each rural village whose population size warrants it but currently lacks such a structure.

Their responses are tabulated below:<sup>47</sup>

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**Table 3 Comparative Capabilities--Military Versus Civilian**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>MIL/CIV CAPABILITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Guatemala	Medical	20%/80%	Mil only in insurgent areas (50% of the countryside)
	Road (km)	1,200/2,000	Mil cost significantly lower
	Water	60%/80%	Good water
	Building	80%/80%	Mil only in insurgent areas (50% of the countryside), civ only before elections
Honduras	Medical	35%/50%	Mil lacks desire
	Roads (km)	600/2,000	Mil lacks equip/civ maintenance lacking
	Water	10%/10%	Maintenance and funds
	Building	12%/15%	Lack funds
Bolivia	Medical	10%/15%	Mil & civ lack funding
	Roads (km)	150/3,000	Funds/mil lacks operable equip
	Water	15%/40%	Good water
	Building	20%/65%	Mil lack funds/not civ priority

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As expected, the above responses indicate the civilian sector has more capability. However, they do reflect considerable capability on

the part of the armed forces. Lack of funds and operable equipment were the most frequent limitations noted, which may make the military unsuitable for some tasks. But with proper leadership and integration with other civilian efforts, MCA can lead to considerably greater accomplishments in rural development.

#### Criteria Questions for Military Civic Action

The "Pros and Cons" chapter has shown use of the military in infrastructure development has pluses and/or minuses. Whether or not it is the right program today for a given country must be determined on a country-by-country basis. If a nation decides to see if MCA makes sense for its rural infrastructure development, then several questions need to be examined before making a final determination. These criteria questions are useful in conducting such an initial analysis or a review of existing efforts.

There are a few basic questions, of course, that have rather obvious answers. For instance, "Where should the military be involved in infrastructure development--urban or rural areas?" In the early history of the U.S., it was predominantly rural. For purposes of this paper, the rural area is assumed to be the most logical place for MCA to be used. Another basic question is, "Is there a need for rural development?" Consider for a moment a few statistics. One hundred million have no shelter. Seven hundred million do not have enough food to actively work. Over one billion do not have safe drinking water.<sup>48</sup> And the list goes on. Is rural development needed? The clear answer is "YES!" Having made those two assumptions, let us examine other criteria questions.

o Which organizations can best meet the rural development needs-- military, government civilian, and/or private sector? One yardstick for determining which of the three types of organizations or which combination thereof should be relative effectiveness, in terms of cost, quality, and quantity of service. Sometimes the military may be more cost effective. As previously mentioned, the military roads built in Pakistan and Guatemala have provided their governments with substantial savings. However, if the military needs additional training and/or equipment but the civilian sector does not, then the civilian sector may be the most cost effective. Receptivity to who is providing the service may also be a factor. Because of past military abuses, the rural populace may not trust the motives behind the military's sudden interest in their area. On the other hand, in the face of an on-going insurgency such as in El Salvador or Guatemala, the military may be the only ones willing to operate in hostile territory. In addition, commercial profitability may eliminate private sector interest.

o Which tasks should be assigned to the military or would only be accomplished if the military did them? Historically, many rural development tasks such as medical/dental care, road building, building of schools, clean water sources, etc., have been performed by the armed forces during training exercises. Joint U.S.-Honduran exercises in recent years are a good case of ad hoc accomplishment of these types of tasks. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a determination must be made as to what skills and capabilities the military has that are applicable to the development tasks. Whether or not an insurgency is ongoing is another factor. For example, in Guatemala, the military is frequently the only government agency performing rural development

activities. In the case of Guatemala as well, the military's rural road building capability is much more efficient and cost effective than that of its civilian counterparts. According to a senior Guatemalan officer, a 30 kilometer section of rural road could be constructed by the military in about 60 days for about \$2-3 million. He estimated a civilian firm under government contract would require about two years and \$10-12 million for the same 30 kilometer road segment.<sup>49</sup> Such cost savings cannot be ignored.

By using untapped or more cost effective military capability, a combined civil-military effort could accelerate the providing of essential human services to rural areas, boost government legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, and help meet some of the long-standing needs of the populace. Systematically attacking these root causes of popular discontent also meets one of the key goals of U.S. LIC policy. By progressively meeting rural needs through combined civil-military programs, the government removes an important propaganda wedge from insurgent group arsenals, one insurgents frequently exploit when trying to gain support from the general populace.

o What training is required, and how much is transferable to the civilian sector after termination of military service? In many cases, rural development activities are hampered by lack of skills, especially preventive equipment maintenance. Many a vehicle or water well hand pump has become inoperative for want of adequate, periodic re-lubrication. Entering the armed forces to learn a skill later transferable to civilian life has been a time-honored tradition in the U.S. As one U.S. recruiting pitch goes, "The armed forces--a great

place to start." Because many Third World countries still maintain a draft (usually two years), similar training opportunities are present. When coupled with high civilian unemployment, attaining skills useful for rural development while in the military could help solve several problems at once--unemployment and a skilled work force that could help reverse the rural-to-urban migration. Here the military must be careful to ensure the skills are in fact needed in the civilian sector.

o If the military is assigned rural development projects, what degradation will occur to the military's capability to perform its traditional tasks? When a military establishment performs rural development tasks, one logically assumes a less capable military force. A cost/benefit/risk assessment must be made to determine the level of degradation to military warfighting skills a government is willing to accept. As many Third World countries have two-year conscriptions, a large part of training time is spent in attaining basic military skills. Depending on the educational level of the conscripts, little additional time may be available to teach nonmilitary skills. If the recruit education level permits, then some increment of training/operations may be devoted to rural development tasks. For instance, some U.S. trainers who have worked with the Honduran armed forces indicated that up to 20 percent of a training month could probably be devoted to rural development activities without degrading military capability.<sup>50</sup>

o If the military were to perform certain tasks, what impact would this have on civilian employment? Sometimes assigning civilian-capable jobs to the military may exacerbate civilian unemployment. This assumes there are sufficient skilled civilians available to perform the tasks. Otherwise, skill attainment training costs must be factored in.

If neither sector is skilled, a determination needs to be made as to which sector will best serve the nation's needs over the long haul.

o Regardless of which organization undertakes rural development, what will the participation level of the local populace be? The level of participation by the local populace has a profound impact on whether or not rural development will succeed or fail in the long-run. A semiannual civic action report from Thailand had some interesting observations about water well pumps in remote areas. The report stated:

We feel that the well and pump portions of this program are potentially the most productive of all the 606th Civic Action Center projects which have been attempted. . . . Money and effort invested in sanitation equipment and education are likely to have more of a lasting benefit than money spent on throat lozenges, aspirin, and cough syrup to be passed out like candy during a sick call.<sup>51</sup>

Yet the same report indicated the following concerns about the pump maintenance and repair program:

Many safe wells have been abandoned or contaminated because the pump needed lubrication or similar simple care. It seems inconceivable that no villager would be able to make the simple adjustments required, yet in village after village we found no one who had the interest or curiosity to even attempt repair of a simple pump.<sup>52</sup>

The same type of lessons came from an interview with a former Peace Corps volunteer who had worked in rural Guatemala.<sup>53</sup> He held that if the villagers did not want the project or wanted it for the wrong reasons, it was foolish to perform a simple water system installation where well water was pumped via shallow buried pipe to a central cistern in a village. He said that when one of the farmers broke the pipe with his plow, the farmer's attitude was, "It's not my pipe anyway, why should I be concerned and fix it. Let the Americans do it."

A similar sentiment was found in an oral history report from Vietnam. It stated that the Buddhist philosophy was if the Americans

are so wealthy they are giving it away, you owed them nothing in return.<sup>54</sup> People seem to have little respect for things they do not earn and/or build.

o Will the military be truly committed to rural development, especially as part of a counterinsurgency strategy? As previously mentioned, a Tanzanian officer felt public works projects were not for soldiers. Such a lack of understanding of what civic action is all about is not a new phenomenon. In a 1969 report by the U.S. Air Force about civic action in the Philippines, the first problem highlighted was a lack of acceptance of civic action at all levels of the Air Force.

Don't forget the general's got a war to help fight. He'll get support for that. But it just doesn't seem like anybody up or down the line is supporting him for civic action. Look what happens when he tries to get funds or manpower to actually start doing the job.<sup>55</sup>

In the report, many officers questioned the whole rationale for civic action as indicated below:

A cause and effect relationship cannot be assumed between civic action projects conducted by military units and the loyalty or respect of the people for their central government. . . The concept of building a foreign government's civic action program to the point where U.S. assistance is no longer required may or may not be a desired aim from the U.S. point of view.<sup>56</sup>

The report further assessed the Thailand program as follows: "If the U.S. pulls out of civic action there, the program will collapse."<sup>57</sup>

Fortunately, the U.S. assessment was incorrect, as the following review of the Thailand situation will show. Thailand was faced with a growing Maoist, rural-based insurgency in the northeast. Using the U.S. strategy of MCA combined with "search and destroy" missions, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was having less and less success defeating the guerrillas. In 1972, the RTA changed its application of MCA and

patrolling. First, the soldiers stayed in the villages to protect them. There were no more sweep operations. Second, they asked the villagers what they wanted done. The village chieftain would specify a particular need. Then the RTA, with U.S. assistance, would provide the necessary materials. The actual work was left to the villagers. As a follow-on, villagers were allowed to "volunteer" to become part of a civil defense ranger force known as Tahan Pran. These militia units were equipped with the same weapons as the RTA. As the Tahan Pran became more effective, the RTA would eventually leave and go secure other villages. The RTA strategy worked after ten years of consistent application. By 1982, large numbers of the guerrillas surrendered and were warmly repatriated into Thai society. Many were given farm land to resettle.<sup>58</sup>

Military civic action, when properly applied in conjunction with military force, works very well countering insurgencies. But it takes a commitment to MCA as an integral part of the campaign to make it work.

**o What are the overall goals for the rural development projects?**

One criticism is that MCA is only used as a rural pacification tool, which will be abandoned once rural unrest is quelled. Ramon Magsaysay's program worked to put down the Huk rebellion by adequately satisfying some fundamental grievances and expectations of the people. Unfortunately, it was discontinued. Whenever possible, MCA should be part of a national plan to correct fundamental societal needs.

**o Should rural development projects be short-term or long-term?**

Frequently, rural development projects are of a short-term, high impact nature. While the need to show a "product" is essential, sometimes it may do more harm than good. For instance, the U.S. has helped construct a magnificent hospital in rural Peru. Unfortunately, a key ingredient



was overlooked--a trained staff. As a result, the "white elephant" goes largely unused. In one case in Honduras, a portable "MASH" hospital was erected, with its equipment to be run by a diesel generator. Unfortunately, diesel fuel was not extensively used in that locale as it was too expensive. Consequently, this "Yankee" hospital also received little use.<sup>59</sup> These examples of good intentions gone awry then become ripe for exploitation by various dissident groups often hostile to the central government.

Even long-term involvement does not guarantee success. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank in its 1989 Report, Social and Economic Progress in Latin America, stated in its section on agriculture:

After three decades and a sizable financial investment, there is evidence that the objectives have not been met. To the contrary, the policies applied and the mechanisms used to implement them may have had regressive effects. For the international financial community, the implication is that promoting subsidized loans does not necessarily improve or accelerate development.<sup>60</sup>

In the military realm in Honduras, similar comments can be found. Since 1984, seven different U.S. task forces, in cooperation with their Honduran military counterparts, have been building (and rebuilding) 76.8 kilometers of mountain road in north central Honduras from Yoro to Jocón and then to San Lorenzo. Each year, a task force of approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel works on the road during the "dry season", which is normally December through June. Construction during the "rainy season" is virtually impossible due to torrential downpours. To date, about 43 kilometers have been completed at an approximate cost of \$50 million.<sup>61</sup> The U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), in a September 1988 economic feasibility study of the road project, concluded:

It is clear that if significant funds for maintenance of the road are not made available, the road will quickly deteriorate to the point that it will be closed to all vehicular traffic. The substantial investment made to date will be lost and the road 'built by the Americans' could become an unusable embarrassment.<sup>62</sup>

Sometimes, American desire to help comes at a rate much greater than a country's ability to absorb such "help". Again, if the Hondurans were unwilling to maintain the road due to inadequately trained people, lack of equipment, and/or funds, why was it constructed in the first place? True, U.S. military engineers received great training. But is it wise to allow over four years and \$50 million worth of effort to become "an unusable embarrassment"?

#### A Few Key Points

No one can answer whether or not MCA is right for a given country without going through the kind of analysis represented by the criteria questions. If MCA is to be successful, it must be something other than a band-aid fix. Unless MCA is integrated with other government development efforts, MCA may well be counterproductive.

Another key consideration is the extent of participation of the local populace in determining which projects, if any, are to be accomplished. Unless the local populace produces a fair share of the sweat and toil needed to bring a project to a successful conclusion, then MCA or any other government rural development project is likely to fail. As in the Thailand example, the people had a voice and a stake in how to improve their standard of living. The government's approach also showed that the government was willing to listen to the people and was trying to help them with tangible items like a well or road.

A third point is that the type of project must be right for the education and experience level of the people. Time and again projects fail because no one can do simple, preventive maintenance.

Still another factor emerges when one analyzes the approximately 113 countries that comprise the Third World--the number of governments controlled or dominated by the military. In 1960, only 26 percent of Third World countries were under military dominance, i.e., the military enjoyed significant executive and/or judicial-legislative power; by 1988, the number was up to 57 percent.<sup>63</sup> Despite a strong desire on the part of the U.S. for democratic, civilian-controlled governments, one must face the reality of military dominance in more than half of the Third World.

Using MCA properly in these countries takes advantage of military strengths such as leadership, organization, and discipline, while at the same time promoting development needs. As another author observed:

The long-range goal of military civic action is nation building. In underdeveloped countries, the military establishment has a great capability to nurture national development and, in many cases, has a relative monopoly over leadership, technical skills, administrative experience, mobility, and a willingness. . . to spend time away from urban centers.<sup>64</sup>

In Africa, a region heavily dominated by the military, there is a growing awareness of what MCA can do. At a 1988 African military trade show, the International Exhibition for Security and the Army held in Libreville, Gabon, the conference theme was, "Applications of the Peace Time Army for Civic Action."<sup>65</sup> While not a commitment by African leaders to MCA, the conference theme indicates their willingness to explore alternatives.

Finally, one must take into account the huge debt most Third World countries face. Coupled with shrinking U.S. international assistance budgets, Third World countries must make the most of their existing resources. Given the austere budget climate around much of the world, the time may be right to revive the proper application of MDA, even when a country is not faced with an insurgency.

## CHAPTER VII

### IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES STRATEGY

Military civic action is not a new concept; indeed, it dates from ancient times. Even in early U.S. history, the military played a significant role in meeting the dual development-defense needs of the U.S. as the fledgling republic moved westward. When MCA has been properly applied as an integral part of a Third World nation's development strategy, it has played a positive role in national development, meeting dual development-defense needs without major duplication of resources. In fact, the author's limited research indicated a significant capability resident within several host nations' military to perform rural development tasks. Consequently, the question is, "Does MCA have relevance in today's world, and more specifically, can MCA further U.S. national security interests, especially in the LIC environment prevalent in the Third World?"

Before we attempt to answer these questions, a brief review of the three key goals of U.S. national security strategy is in order. They are to take action to "ameliorate the root causes. . . before instability leads to widespread violence. . . strengthen the threatened regime's capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability. . . ." The most appropriate use of U.S. military power to accomplish these goals is "usually indirect through security assistance--training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply

of essential military equipment." Achieving these three goals through indirect application of U.S. military power can best be viewed as a preventive medicine LIC strategy--treating the root causes, not just the symptoms; acting before violence becomes widespread; and making the country, not the U.S., responsible for "winning" its war.

#### Better Department/Agency Integration Needed

The U.S. government is in a unique position to influence a Third World government's decisions in these matters by a combination of planning assistance, development program aid, technical trainers, supplying equipment, etc. But, if MCA is to become an integral part of Third World national development plans, a fundamental shift in attitude and/or U.S. policy is needed.

Currently, funds for development and defense needs come out of two different pots of money that normally cannot be intermingled. Having a single agency do both development and defense is frowned upon. Moreover, with the current U.S. emphasis on democratization, any shift that may give more prestige to a fragile democracy's military is usually not tolerated. A former Colombian general in a talk to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces highlighted this rivalry. "The politicians do not want the military to become more involved in community activities since this would increase their visibility and make them a stronger force to contend with."<sup>66</sup>

This same kind of "turf battle" between the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) and the Department of Defense has led to less than fully integrated U.S. government efforts in many Third World countries. During the author's 1986 visit to Honduras, one remark

was, "When the military is in the valley, A.I.D. and the Peace Corps leave." Better cooperation and flexibility among U.S. government departments and agencies is needed in order to better meet the dual development-defense needs of our Third World friends and allies.

Congress has recently recognized the needed for increased flexibility for DOD in meeting fundamental human needs referred to as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities. Title 10 U.S.C. sec. 401 (e) defines HCA activities as:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.<sup>67</sup>

Congress also requires DOD to report annually monies expended toward these types of HCA activities. In the course of reviewing reports on such annual expenditures, one glaring point came out. There appeared to be no cohesive plan to explain why activities were accomplished in a given area. It would appear that DOD efforts, even though they must be coordinated with the Department of State, are "band-aid" projects of opportunity. Remember one of the key points to make MCA successful is that it must be part of an integrated national development plan. A review of Air Force histories for U.S. Southern Command for 1984-1988 likewise failed to reveal any comprehensive, coordinated plan to integrate DOD-DOS efforts with host nation plans.<sup>68</sup> Some major projects like the Yoro-Jocon-San Lorenzo road building

project in Honduras did reflect considerable host nation coordination, but the majority of other activities did not.

#### Humanitarian Civic Assistance Emphasizes United States Participation

Title 10 specifies that DOD HCA activities must meet additional criteria for U.S. forces to participate. Specifically, they are:

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the activities will promote --

(a) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and

(b) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

"Authorized military operations" include exercises in which [AC and] RC units and personnel participate, whether the exercises are directed and coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or are single-service exercises. The Secretary of State must approve any HCA activities carried out pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C. sec. 401.

HCA activities undertaken in conjunction with military operations must be funded from appropriations specifically provided for that purpose, 10 U.S.C. sec 401 (c)(1), and cannot be used to provide assistance, directly or indirectly, to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary activity, 10 U.S.C. sec. 401 (a)(3).<sup>69</sup>

There are a few observations needed at this point. First, these operations must meet the security interests of both countries as well as promote operational readiness skills of the U.S. members involved. But one of the key goals of the U.S. national security strategy is that these countries must have sufficient capabilities of their own to "win" their own LIC. If HCA or MCA is to be "their program", then the U.S. must allow them the opportunity to develop the requisite capabilities.



Take the case of the Yoro-Jocón-San Lorenzo road building project in north central Honduras. As previously mentioned, since 1984, seven different U.S. task forces, in cooperation with their Honduran military counterparts, have been building (and rebuilding) 76.8 kilometers of mountain road in north central Honduras from Yoro to Jocón and then to San Lorenzo. Again, as already noted, the A.I.D. September 1988 report concluded:

It is clear that if significant funds for maintenance of the road are not made available, the road will quickly deteriorate to the point that it will be closed to all vehicular traffic. The substantial investment made to date will be lost and the road 'built by the Americans' could become an unusable embarrassment.<sup>70</sup>

Why did the report label the road as "built by the Americans"? The author's discussions with members of the 1988-1989 task force revealed that seven of eight work sites were run by the Americans.<sup>71</sup> Not only was just one site run by the Honduran military engineers, but much of the equipment the Hondurans used was "on loan" from the Americans.

When viewed from a U.S. reserve forces perspective, it was the best training overall the units had received. Thousands of people were treated by medical and dental personnel. Donations of clothing were distributed. The individual soldiers felt good, and the impoverished locals were obviously grateful. Yet, when viewed from the long-term strategic perspective, such activity may be fatally flawed. For instance, what happens when the U.S. pulls out of the area? Will the local populace receive the same level of medical and dental care as when the Americans were there? As each segment of the road was completed, it received substantial use. But because maintenance was not being performed on the road, it frequently became unusable. What does that

say to the local populace about the real concerns of the Honduran government for them? Unfortunately, it speaks volumes of the wrong words.

Thus, the building of a very difficult road with the best of intentions has become an embarrassment and a propaganda tool dissidents can easily use against both the U.S. and the legitimate government of Honduras. Unless the project is (1) something the host nation populace wants and (2) something they are willing to work on extensively themselves, then the U.S. should not support such projects. One out of eight work sites is not a "fair share"!

The new Title 10 HCA authorizations unfortunately are keyed on U.S. participation. Let us look at another effort frequently cited as a great success for U.S. HCA efforts.<sup>72</sup> In 1986, severe earthquakes ravaged Ecuador. Then Vice President Bush promised U.S. government assistance. A military engineer task force, Task Force 1169, went over the Andean ridge into the eastern jungles of the Napo Province. The task force's mission was to build a bridge across the Rio Hollin river and rebuild/improve as much road as possible in four and a half months. How much of the work was cooperatively accomplished by the U.S. and Ecuadoran military engineers? Almost none. Consider the remarks of the quasi-official spokesman of the town of Archidona during the exercise:

About 95 percent of the people are happy to have the North Americans here. The other five percent are communists. The soldiers have been working hard, not exploiting us, not getting drunk like the communists said they would do, just working hard. It will be disappointing to see the soldiers leave because the road may never be completed without them, and our dream of uniting the towns of the Napo Province may never be realized. We don't ask for much--just one road.<sup>73</sup>

True, this was disaster relief, which may call for extraordinary measures. But it was not relief of a life threatening situation. It was showing U.S. concern for its Latin American neighbor. The people wanted just one road. Did they work and participate in the build of the bridge and roads? No. Today, alas, the bridge has been washed away as the result of another minor earthquake, and the people still do not have their road. Because the people did not help build the road and because of the low priority the Napo Province receives from the Ecuadoran government, dissidents have another festering wound to exploit. United States strategy implementation must be changed.

#### Training Needs Refocusing

Another key aspect of the indirect security assistance strategy is training. If LIC is where the action is in the foreseeable future, then the weight of U.S. training efforts seems misplaced. Consider for a moment the number of U.S. military advisors in Third World countries. In 1965, the number of U.S. and Soviet bloc military advisors in Third World countries was nearly equal. Today, Soviet bloc military advisors outnumber U.S. military advisors by a ratio of more than 30-to-1. If one examines influence through training, the U.S. trains one-third fewer Third World military personnel today than it did in 1970. Today, the Soviet bloc trains nearly twice as many Third World military personnel as the U.S. does.<sup>74</sup>

Implementation of the training strategy points to another flaw. As previously noted in both the Honduran and Ecuadoran road and bridge building projects, the U.S. received the greatest benefit from the

training and did most of the work. The training focus must swing toward building "their" capability to do the projects.

At this point, a look at the Indonesian experience may prove beneficial with regard to correct training applications. During the late 1950s, Indonesia was struggling with a growing communist movement. The Indonesian Communist Party was supported by President Sukarno but was opposed by the Indonesian Army (TNI). Direct U.S. intervention was out of the question, so an indirect strategy was devised. It involved training of TNI officers in the U.S. and establishing a civic action program in Indonesia. The U.S. supplied heavy engineer equipment, farm tools, etc., and funds to sustain the operation. In addition, the U.S. provided maintenance training so the TNI could keep the equipment in operating condition.

It is important to note that the TNI did not want U.S. advisors or counterparts in-country, but only the tools, funds, and training to meet its rural development objectives.<sup>75</sup> This program gave the TNI an entry into the villages to observe/counter the communist organization. It also enabled them to produce items of immediate benefit to the population--roads, medical care, farm tools, etc., something the communists could only promise with words. When the communists attempted to seize power in 1965, the TNI was positioned to quickly quell the coup attempt. Without the training of over 2,600 TNI officers in the U.S. between 1953-1965 and the Indonesian civic action program, Indonesia could have been another communist victory.<sup>76</sup>

### Develop a Better Preconflict Strategy

Currently, DOD is not oriented toward prevention of conflicts in the LIC environment. By contrast, DOD has a superior deterrence strategy in the nuclear arena--peace through strength. When one attempts to interest warriors in preventing conflicts through MCA and developmental assistance, one quickly becomes branded as an outcast. As someone said, "Are you a LICer or a warfighter?" Today, one needs to be both. Unfortunately, when DOD is involved in development assistance and MCA, it is usually done on an ad hoc mission.

To elevate developmental assistance and MCA to a primary or even a secondary DOD mission will require substantial cost/benefit/risk analysis. With constrained and/or declining military spending, increasing a capability in one area normally requires decreasing a capability in another. Development assistance and MCA do not stack up well against warfighting priorities.

One concern within some military circles is trying to apply combat trained forces in a noncombat situation. The Israeli Army possesses some of the best ground combat forces in the world today. Yet in the West Bank of Jerusalem, they make terrible policemen. This loss of the combat edge and trying to fill roles diametrically opposed to combat instincts is a valid concern.

Others will point to the recent U.S. invasion of Panama as a reason for not becoming wholeheartedly involved in an indirect strategy. For the circumstances of Panama, such an application of force was appropriate. The U.S. had exhausted all of its nonmilitary options. General Noriega's declaration of war on the U.S., coupled with the

unprovoked killing of a U.S. officer shortly thereafter, made a response necessary. Also, taking the corrupt Panama Defense Force out of a governing role removed one of the major root causes of Panamanian discontent.

What is disturbing at this point is that this type of operation is now viewed by many as what U.S. military involvement in LIC is all about. A recent U.S. Army lecture and video clip about light infantry divisions--rapidly deployable forces that can meet the LIC threat--brought this point home. To provide a training ground to exercise LIC-related operations, the Joint Readiness Training Center in Arkansas was created. If the most appropriate application of U.S. military power in LIC is usually indirect through security assistance--training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment, then one could never tell it by the video clip provided. Light infantry divisions in LIC means one thing--combat!

True, as Panama showed, combat does have its place in LIC for U.S. forces. And because it is such a high-visibility, high-risk operation, U.S. forces must do it right the first time. But prevention or deterrence of combat should be the highest goal of the military.

Developing a corresponding, overarching indirect military strategy and leaders skillful in LIC noncombat operational art, who can plan and execute the noncombat aspects of LIC campaign plans, will not be easy. Such leaders are in scarce supply. Moreover, indirect application of U.S. military power is not sexy and in all likelihood will not get one promoted to general. But the time may be right for rethinking and reorienting a portion of the U.S. military juggernaut.

### Define Low Intensity Conflict Missions and Organizational Structure

If a cornerstone of U.S. LIC strategy remains indirect, noncombat application of military power through security assistance, then some realigning of military missions may be necessary. Enhanced military-to-military nation building activities may be an ideal leverage point to further U.S. interests in the LIC environment. If U.S. leaders decide to elevate nation building by the military beyond its current ad hoc status, then an analysis must be performed to determine how much redirection can be done without significantly detracting from U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence capability. For instance, there may be significant impacts on training, equipment requirements, and organizational structure.

Take the task forces used in Honduras and Ecuador. These were a patchwork force--a force not focused, trained, or equipped for that specific mission. There simply was no organization routinely structured to perform that type of mission in a peacetime LIC environment. If aspects of nation building and MCA become part of a military LIC mission, then some minor restructuring of U.S. forces and equipment may be needed. Hopefully this would substantially improve U.S. capabilities to support and train the forces of our Third World friends and allies for their MCA activities. Yet this restructuring should not sacrifice U.S. warfighting capability.

### Balance Low Intensity Conflict Equipment Needs

United States operations in the Persian Gulf also raised key questions about the suitability of U.S. equipment. In congressional testimony, General George Crist, then Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, amplified the difficulties LIC presents:

What we are faced with in the northern part of the [Persian] Gulf is low intensity conflict at sea. We did not build our boats or ships to fight that kind of war. Even the boats that we built for Vietnam are riverboats, designed for duty in rivers, not open seas. . . . People are beginning to realize that we need to look more closely at this lower end of the conflict spectrum, that low intensity conflict is not necessarily just in Latin America.<sup>77</sup>

If U.S. forces have difficulty obtaining the proper equipment for LIC operations, then our friends and allies will have an equally difficult time. When one reviews much of the engineer equipment in current U.S. inventories, much of it is Korean War vintage and very difficult to maintain. Somehow, procurement of modern, maintainable equipment more applicable to the LIC environment is needed, both for the U.S. and its friends and allies.

#### Which Part of the "Total Force" to Use?

When looking at reserve component forces, other issues must be addressed. Historically, the most suitable missions for the reserve components were envisioned to be those with low peacetime activity levels and high wartime surge requirements. Accordingly, if a mission had to be performed on a daily basis or required daily training, then that mission was best suited to the active component.<sup>78</sup>

With a shrinking active force and a vast preponderance of "nation building" capability already in the reserve components, can the active side handle the day-to-day requirements of a protracted LIC campaign plan? Strategists and force planners must decide where these Total Force nation building assets will come from.

In the author's opinion, selected reserve component units should be designated as primary peacetime LIC nation building forces with a secondary mission to support major wartime contingency plans. This



designation would substantially alter training, equipment requirements, and the evaluation "report card" for these selected units.

#### Long-term Multi-year Funding Needed

In the funding area, additional appropriations would be needed in either the security assistance program "150" accounts or DOD appropriations under 10 U.S.C. section 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. With various Program Decision Budget memoranda already indicating the cancellation or postponement of major new systems like the V-22 Osprey, one would expect the military service chiefs to be very reluctant to give up more resources to combat the insidious threat of LIC.<sup>79</sup> However, the President's bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy (CILTS) indicated that a total U.S. LIC strategy could be funded for an annual cost of approximately \$12 billion without significantly impairing the U.S. ability to prosecute higher intensity wars.<sup>80</sup>

A supporting report by the Regional Conflict Working Group (RCWG), a sub-group of CILTS, recommended basic reforms in the security assistance arena. The first of 12 such recommendations centered on the vital necessity of obtaining multi-year security assistance appropriations from Congress. The RCWG indicated that consistent funding over time was more important than any given amount in a specific year.<sup>81</sup> When faced with year-to-year budget uncertainties, effective long-term planning by individual country teams is very difficult. The RCWG further concluded that only a portion of the \$12 billion annual outlay would require new appropriations.<sup>82</sup>

### Concluding Remarks

The choices the national leadership must make with regard to LIC strategy and resources will be difficult. An integrated, long-term approach designed to help our friends and allies develop economically viable, democratic societies is a prudent investment in America's future. By careful country-by-country analysis using the criteria questions, MCA will be appropriately integrated into each country's development planning and corresponding U.S. assistance efforts.

The U.S. can successfully implement a preventive medicine LIC strategy by having (1) an expanded security assistance program with MCA, where applicable, a key focus; (2) more U.S. military advisor "presence"; (3) projects that are both "appropriate and theirs"; and (4) multi-year, prudently funded programs. The U.S. armed forces, with their immense capability to directly and positively impact our lesser developed friends and allies, can make MCA an essential part of the noncombatant aspects of U.S. LIC strategy.

Change in the Third World is inevitable, either evolutionary or revolutionary, all that is lacking is a catalyst. The U.S. and its armed forces through selective application of the principles of MCA can provide a catalyst that moves nations toward security, freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.

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